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PRACTICES AND MORPHOGENESIS 
Alistair Mutch 
Abstract 
Working within an Archerian morphogenetic framework, I suggest that we to need pay more 
attention to practices. Instead of the mainstream focus on practice as action, I argue that we 
should pay attention to practices as a key structural and cultural element of analysis. To 
illustrate my argument, I draw on historical work on comparative religious practices, 
specifically the distinction between rituals and routines. A focus on the latter as the 
conditions of possibility for the former leads to some implications for the thesis of the 
morphogenesis of contemporary society. An analysis of the relationship between religious 
rituals and routines stresses the importance of placing both in their wider cultural and 
structural context. Such an examination points to the significance of advances in technology 
and changes in modes of dissemination as important factors.   
KEYWORDS: Practice; religious practice; Church of Scotland; morphogenesis 
There has been much discussion in sociological approaches founded on critical realism about 
the role of practice. In particular, there has been extensive debate about the nature of habitual 
action (for example, Archer 2010; Porpora 2015; Sayer 2010). The purpose of this article is 
not to enter into that debate, but to suggest that our focus on habitual action may have 
diverted our attention from the nature of ‘practices’ as nouns rather than verbs. By that, I 
mean that attention to certain forms of practices can be of considerable value in furthering 
our analysis of contemporary society, directing our attention to new phenomena and 
providing a ‘way in’ to the nexus between structure, culture and agency. Specifically, I want 
to discuss two particular types of practice, namely rituals and routines, both of which are 
informed by historical investigations of religious organizations and by contemporary debates 
in organizational analysis. 
My analysis is broadly based on the morphogenetic framework of analysis developed by 
Margaret Archer (Archer 1995).1 Like Archer, I have doubts about the value of Bourdieu’s 
concept of ‘habitus’ in the context of organizational life (Mutch 2003).  For Bourdieu, 
practice is constituted by the ‘rules of the game’. It is embedded in the habitus, which it 
regulates and directs conduct in a largely unconscious fashion. Bourdieu’s habitus is an 
embodied disposition that acts in a similar fashion in different contexts. It is linked the 
structural conditioning experienced by the actor from birth and is relatively resistant to 
change.  Archer argues that Bourdieu’s habitus collapses terms together which need to be 
held apart for analytical purchase; it therefore provides an impoverished view of the 
reflective capacity of persons. 
These debates are important, but our focus on them has perhaps meant that we have neglected 
other insights. I note, as does Douglas Porpora (2015) that, according to Archer, there are two 
senses in which practical action plays a central role in the world. In one sense, pre-linguistic 
understandings of the world (practical action) give rise to both a sense of the self and to the 
formation of abstract reasoning. In another sense, embodied persons must necessarily engage 
in practical action in relation to three orders of existence: the natural, the practical and the 
social. Practice in this sense is important, but I see it as leading to a focus on practice as 
action. Archer does not take this next step because she is anxious to avoid what she sees as 
the conflation of structure, agency and culture in practice theory. Whilst I concur with her 
concerns, I nevertheless suggest that, by returning to an early formulation in Roy Bhaskar’s 
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Transformational Model of Social Action (TMSA), we can avoid conflation by looking at the 
ways in which certain practices form logics of action which are at their most powerful when 
taken-for-granted. 
Towards the end of this article, I consider questions of the taken-for-grantedness of practice, 
as well as the need to consider the material dimension of practices as instantiated in 
technological artefacts. However, to begin with, I explore the place of practices in Archer’s 
and Porpora’s morphogenetic framework (Porpora is an advocate Archer’s work in this 
respect). Specifically, I discuss their approach to understanding certain contrasting religious 
practices. My analysis distinguishes between rituals and routines, and draws on insights from 
Weber and Foucault. To illustrate my argument, I consider the contrasting practices of 
religious communion in Scotland and England in the eighteenth century. These examples are 
used to illustrate the way in which analytical narratives of emergence, fostered by a 
morphogenetic approach, enable us to connect practices to their wider context.  
The place of practices in the morphogenetic framework 
Archer’s morphogenetic framework encompasses practices. Nevertheless, I suggest that 
practices are underplayed because of a tendency to conflate ‘practice’ and ‘practices’. Since 
1995, Archer has published extensively on social theory informed by critical realism; the 
result is a complex, sophisticated and challenging body of work. Archer’s original work 
provided the contextual conditions for the exercise of agency; more recently she has devoted 
attention to the nature of reflexivity, especially in formulating her views on the ‘internal 
conversation’ (Archer 2003). It is impossible to do justice to Archer’s work in this short 
piece, so my focus here is on practice and practices in the context of her morphogenetic 
approach to structure and culture. Most of my analysis is based on her 1995 book Realist 
Social Theory, since this remains the work that most authors draw upon.  
For the purpose of the present discussion, two aspects of Archer’s treatment of cultural items 
– which she argues must be considered along with social items – are worthy of note. The first 
is that ideas about practices are not just limited to the performance of cultural practice but, 
once produced, can be incorporated into more enduring cultural items, such as theories, that 
then form the ideational context for subsequent rounds of performance. The second is that her 
discussion tends to involve large sweeps of time in which the focus is on grand ideas rather 
than more mundane practices. The same could be said for Realist Social Theory, in which 
Archer explicates her morphogenetic framework. Practices do not feature explicitly here, 
although it is important to note Archer’s argument that the framework she proposes could be 
used at any scale of activity. As she puts it,  
Analytical dualism can be used by any researcher to gain theoretical purchase on 
much smaller problems where the major difficulty of seeing the wood from the trees 
becomes much more tractable if they can be sorted out into the components of 
temporal cycles of morphogenesis - however short the time-span involved may be 
(Archer, 1996: 228). 
She argues that the central dilemma of social theory, the relationship between structure and 
agency, has traditionally been addressed in three ways. Specifically, ‘downwards 
conflationism’ occurs when human activity is simply ‘read off’ structural conditions, as in 
forms of economic determinism; by contrast, ‘upwards conflationism’ involves the reduction 
of all social activity to individual action. Archer argued that when sociologists try to avoid 
these poles by refusing to grant primacy to either, they merely conflate the two, resulting in 
‘central conflationism’. She associated central conflationism with the structuration theory of 
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Anthony Giddens (1976). Archer used her well-developed historical sociology to argue that 
the collapse of structure into action as ‘memory traces’ in Giddens’ work prevented analysis 
of the interplay between the contexts in which actors found themselves involuntarily placed 
and the action that they engaged in. As Giddens drew extensively on practice theory, in 
which knowledge and skilled actors carried out the ‘rules of the game’ in producing and 
reproducing social life, it is perhaps not surprising that practice, as opposed to practices, 
came in for critique, identified as it was with forms of analysis that folded context into 
performance. However, it needs to be stressed that the morphogenetic approach is compatible 
with the assumption that social practices, and cultural ideas about such practices, are a key 
part of the structural domain.  
A basic premise of the morphogenetic approach, as laid out in Figure 1, is that structural and 
cultural items have ontological status. Although these items are activity dependent,  once they 
are produced  they are relatively enduring. The method of analytical dualism allows 
researchers to examine the relationship between context and action over time. In Archer’s 
words,  
every morphogenetic cycle distinguishes three broad analytical phases consisting of (a) a 
given structure (a complex set of relations between parts), which conditions but does not 
determine (b), social interaction. Here, (b) also arises in part from action orientations 
unconditioned by social organization but emanating from current agents, and in turn leads to 
(c), structural elaboration or modification - that is, to a change in the relations between parts 
where morphogenesis rather than morphostasis ensued (Archer, 1995: 91). 
Insert figure one about here 
As I have argued, practices are not ruled out in a morphogenetic analysis but two factors, I 
would suggest, have rendered them relatively invisible in work which draws upon Archer. 
One is the broad sweep of the argument, which tends to deal with large scale societal change 
to make its points. The second is the lingering impact of the emergence of the ideas from the 
critique of practice theories, which tends perhaps to conflate practice and practices. It is to 
this conflation – and a clearer specification of the difference between practice and practices – 
that I turn next.  
Practice and Practices 
The concern that practice theory, as exemplified by the work of Bourdieu (1990) and Giddens 
(1984), is guilty of ‘central conflationism’ stems from a focus on practice as action. In this 
view, the problem is that structure and culture are folded into activity. This activity is then 
seen as guided by habit, by largely unconscious dispositions that lead to the charge that 
persons are turned into ‘zombies’. At best, they are cultural dopes who are ‘performed’ by the 
practices they engage in. The counter to this is to stress the capacity of persons to engage in 
reflection fuelled by their ultimate values. In order to do this, the emphasis is against notions 
of habit as guides to action. Porpora (2015,153-5) for example, spends some time describing 
his own morning routine, stressing how it involves reflection at each stage. There are two 
problems with this. While it ably defends the notion of reflexive persons (and this is a stance 
to be held on to) it rather downplays the specification of practices by others. In the case of 
domestic routines, there is a strong degree of agential choice. However, Porpora citing 
Becker (2015, 127) has earlier endorsed an observation about rules, namely that: ‘Differences 
in the ability to make rules and apply them to other people are essentially power differentials 
(either legal or extralegal). Those groups whose social position gives them weapons and 
power are best able to enforce their rules.’ This is the situation which, as we will see, often 
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obtains in formal organizations. It raises important questions about who makes the rules and 
who has the power to enforce them. That power is often, as Lukes (1974) would tell us, at its 
strongest when embedded in practices that are taken to be ‘natural’. The second concern is 
the opening that the focus on creative performances gives to those who would focus on 
practices as patterns of behaviour. This has tended, in the organizational literature, to a focus 
on performance abstracted from the wider context which places limits on that performance 
(Mutch, 2016). The emphasis here is on change in a way that exaggerates the degrees of room 
for manoeuvre that are on offer.  
A slightly different focus on practice is seen in Archer’s formulations. Here practice is that 
which obtains as distinct from official formulations. That is, the focus is on what persons 
actually do, as opposed to what they are told to do or what they ‘ought’ to do. Thus, Archer 
contrasts what Roman Catholics do in relation to sexual practices (contraception, extra-
marital sex) with the official position on such practices. She then goes on to question the 
degree to which membership of the Catholic faithful depends on shared knowledge or 
understanding of those official positions. ‘Every Sunday,’ she observes, ‘it is the duty of the 
faithful to say the Creed but, were it broken down into its component propositions, the most 
diverse array of understood meanings would result’ (Donati and Archer 2015, 174). I argue 
the saying of the Creed is the practice, and it is the saying – rather than the understanding – 
that is important. This becomes clearer when we take a comparative perspective. Creeds are a 
statement of official doctrines, boiled down from more abstruse theological debates. Other 
branches of Christianity also incorporate the recitation of such creeds into their liturgical 
practices, notably the Church of England in its Book of Common Prayer. In turn, this should 
be seen in the context of a wider practice, which is that of a specification for conducting 
services of worship. To be sure, such practices can be contested, but other Christian 
denominations reject both the recitation of creeds and tightly structured forms of worship. As 
opposed to creeds, those in the Reformed Protestant tradition have catechisms. The faithful 
are expected to understand these, and indeed, to recite them, but not as part of an act of 
worship. Rather, they are used for education and, in particular, as a test for worthiness to 
participate in an important practice that we will consider in more detail later, that of 
communion.2  The opposition to structured worship then becomes an article of faith in itself, 
a badge of commitment to a particular set of beliefs and practices, as with the Presbyterian 
commitment to extempore prayers.  This is not to say that such denominations do not have 
forms of structure in their services but, for the present purpose, the contrast points up the 
importance of specified practices in Roman Catholic liturgical practice. 
I will discuss the more conceptual aspects of this discussion further shortly, but first I want to 
illustrate the point with another historical example drawn from Presbyterian practice, 
specifically that found in Scotland.3  This is the practice of seated communion. Communion 
is a central practice in most Christian denominations. It involves the partaking of bread and 
wine, blessed by a religiously sanctioned individual, symbolic of the meal which Jesus was 
said to have presided over before his death and resurrection, the Last Supper. Disputes over 
the meaning and nature of the communion were a central issue in the European Reformation 
which saw Protestant denominations split from Roman Catholicism. The debates over 
whether the bread and wine were actually transformed into the blood and flesh of Christ (the 
transubstantiation thesis) or were merely symbolic are not our concern, although much real 
blood was spilled over such debates. However, such debates transformed practices of taking 
and receiving communion. As opposed to the individual kneeling and taking the communion 
elements from a priest, a practice grew up in Scottish Presbyterianism of taking communion 
in collective form. Seated at a table, the bread and wine, having been introduced to the table 
by the minister with injunctions from the Bible, were passed round from participant to 
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participant (Torrance, 2014). This practice was justified by a reading of the Biblical texts in 
an effort to mirror the Last Supper, reflecting in turn a commitment to return to the practices 
of the primitive church as recorded in the Bible. Now, there are good reasons to doubt the 
theological warrant for this practice. In many ways, it could be read as developed in 
opposition to its Catholic ‘other’. Nevertheless, it persisted, engendering a collective form of 
worship that some argue has influenced American revivalism (Schmidt 2001). That, in the 
eyes of some Presbyterian divines, was a cause for concern. Not only was obvious religious 
emotionalism rather frowned upon, but such practices, as memorably satirised in Robert 
Burns’ ‘The Holy Fair’ provided opportunities for unruly gatherings prone to more secular 
forms of satisfaction. What this meant over time was the shift from sitting at a table to the 
reception of communion sat in pews in the body of the church, a practice which did not 
involve movement and so was considered to be more conducive of order and decorum.4 
Nevertheless, the practice of remaining seated for this most important occasion in the church 
calendar became a taken-for-granted practice, one which only loses that status when 
contrasted to practices in other denominations. 
Such contrasts are not just the province of the historian or the social theorist. Rather, they can 
be expressed by participants themselves under their own descriptions. A memorable example 
of this can be found in the contrast between the two cities, the Puritan Boston and the Quaker 
Philadelphia, essayed by Baltzell (1979, 367).  In that discussion, which indicates the long-
term impact of differential practices grounded in theological commitments, Baltzell (ibid, 
367) reproduces the observation of a Unitarian to her Episcopalian friend: ‘Eliza, do you 
kneel down in church and call yourself a miserable sinner? Neither I nor any member of my 
family will ever do that!’ This suggests that posture at prayer, which can be kneeling, seated 
or standing depending on denomination, is a practice which conveys a sense of identity, 
regardless of the content of such prayers. As we have seen, and will develop, such practices 
cannot be seen as standalone items but as a set of interconnected practices which gain their 
meaning from relationships, both between the items, and in terms of an overarching social 
and cultural context. These examples should also indicate that, in order to surface such 
relationships, it is necessary to engage in comparative analysis, for it is only this which 
reveals their distinctive character (Steinmetz 1998). In the next section, I develop this 
discussion further by drawing a distinction between rituals and routines, one which I will then 
apply to religious practice in comparative fashion using historical examples drawn from 
eighteenth century Scotland and England. In this way, I hope to show that understanding the 
impacts of practices depends on our connection of them to their wider structural and cultural 
context.  
Weber, Foucault and Practices 
I start this discussion of the nature of practices with a revision of the nested set of concepts 
that Archer (1996, 1) uses for the structural dimension of social analysis: ‘roles, 
organizations, institutions, systems’. My revision is to replace ‘roles’ with the suggestion that 
Bhaskar (1979) made in his initial formulation of the TMSA, ‘position-practices’. Although a 
little clumsier than roles, it makes more visible the relationship of practices to particular 
‘slots’ provided by broader structural arrangements. The focus then needs to be on the nature 
of such practices. Recognizing that there are a range of such practices, some of which may 
not be specified in advance and which are responses to the contingent exigencies of the 
particular position, the following discussion focuses on two which seem important: rituals 
and routines.  Some dimensions of these, starting from and continuing with the religious 




At first blush, invoking Weber in the context of something as mundane as practices might 
seem surprising. After all, as Hennis (1988: 181) observes, ‘in all social phenomena it is the 
non-everyday that interests him, that which bursts through everyday life’. We associate him 
with sweeping works of social analysis, most famously in the present context with his much 
misunderstood and contested work on ‘the Protestant ethic’ (Ghosh, 2014). Overlooked, 
however, in the ensuing debate are some hints about taken-for-granted practices in the essay 
on sects that was intended as an important complement to the original essay. In this Weber 
notes (in Gerth and Mills 1948, 312): 
The tremendous social significance of admission to full enjoyment of the rights of the 
sectarian congregation, especially the privilege of being admitted to the Lord's 
Supper, worked among the sects in the direction of breeding that ascetist professional 
ethic which was adequate to modern capitalism during the period of its origin.  
 
He went on to note, although only in passing, some organisational concomitants of this 
restriction of sacraments, such as the circulation of certificates amongst congregations.5 This 
presupposed, as we will see later, further organisational practices such as the recording of 
membership. It also required specific roles to maintain discipline and in this context the 
importance of lay elders (a term to be explained below) is stressed. This focus on the 
implication for practices of theological commitments has been pursued by Philip Gorski in 
his examination of the historical roots of the ‘disciplinary revolution’, in particular through a 
careful exploration of some of the organizational consequences of Reformed Protestantism in 
the Netherlands of the sixteenth century (Gorski 2003). 
Such a focus usefully corrects the emphasis placed by those who follow Foucault on 
seventeenth- and eighteenth-century France. As Gorski comments, from Foucault’s 
discussion ‘one would expect a brief overview of the various disciplinary mechanisms 
invented by Protestant and Catholic religious reformers and of the ways in which territorial 
rulers utilized them as part of their strategies of domination’. However, as he further 
comments, ‘On the concrete social mechanisms through which this power operated, the 
central concern of so much of his work, Foucault is strangely silent’ (Gorski 2003, 24). It is 
not that Foucault does not both emphasize the need to examine such concrete mechanisms 
and that such mechanisms varied by denominational context. On the first point, Foucault 
(2009, 150) is clear that, while histories of beliefs and the organizations they spawned have 
been written, ‘the history of the techniques employed, of the reflections on these pastoral 
techniques, of their development, application, and successive refinements, the history of the 
different types of analysis and knowledge linked to the exercise of pastoral power, has never 
really been undertaken.’ This suggests the need to both uncover those specific techniques and 
to link them to those who had the power to shape them. Foucault proceeds to do this in some 
detail for one such technique, that of auricular confession (2009, 171-195). Using, it has it be 
said, a rather slim range of sources, Foucault examines the development of the practice 
during which an individual adherent confesses his sins6 to an individual priest through the 
mechanism of boxes designed for the purpose.7 This focus on a particular practice and its 
impact on the form of subjectivity characteristic of modernity, chiefly the internalisation of 
the discipline projected, has been the source of much later analysis by followers of Foucault. 
They, however, tend to neglect some of the gaps in his analysis, at times jumping straight 
from the discussion of eighteenth-century practices to those of the present day (Taylor 2009). 
Foucault himself was conscious that his analysis was restricted to one particular practice in 
one specific denomination. As he noted (1999, 177) at one point in his discussion in 
parentheses, ‘I leave to one side the problems of Protestant countries; we will come back to 
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them shortly from another angle’. In another place (Foucault 2009, 228) we find reference to 
aspects of the Protestant Reformation, ‘whose history, what’s more, it would be very 
interesting to trace’. However, these promissory notes were never cashed in, as he moved on 
to discuss other subjects, notably techniques of the self in classical Antiquity.  
This, unfortunately, left a number of gaps in Foucault’s analysis, although these in turn 
perhaps point to features which our analysis of practices has to pay attention to. One is that 
his emphasis on the confessional tends to divorce it from the range of practices in which it 
was entangled (Carrette 2000, 28). Another was his use of manuals for confessors as a guide 
to practice. The value of this is that it shows how practices may be linked to ultimate 
theological commitments through the specification in meso-level documents. However, 
without an examination of the practices themselves this can only ever be incomplete. This is 
not just because practices might evolve creatively as they are resisted or amended. It is also 
because it is often difficult to specify formally the full range of practices necessary to put 
prescribed rituals into practice. It is here that I want to introduce the distinction between 
rituals and the routines that are necessary to put them into operation. I accept some blurring 
in practice between these distinctions, but the distinction has value which I hope to 
demonstrate through concrete examples.  
The cognitive psychologist Harvey Whitehouse (2004, 8) defines rituals as practices which 
display an excess over technical motivation and so invite exegesis. However, ‘procedural 
competence is, therefore, somewhat disconnected from people's explicit concepts of why 
rituals take the form that they do’.  As Asad (1993, 63) suggests, ‘apt performance involves 
not symbols to be interpreted but abilities to be acquired according to rules that are 
sanctioned by those in authority: it presupposes no obscure meanings, but rather the 
formation of physical and linguistic skills’.  That is, in many cases it is perfectly possible to 
take part in rituals successfully and give accounts of that performance, ‘constrained more by 
commonsense principles than by the kind of complex theoretical knowledge available to 
experts’ (Whitehouse 2004, 8).  Hence the danger of seeking to construct ritual performances 
and their meanings from formal bodies of theology alone (Clark 2004, 125-142).   Ritual is 
also important in making connections, connections that come from shared performance rather 
than, necessarily, shared values. So, observes Whitehouse, ‘what it means to be a regular 
churchgoer is not to be part of a particular group but to participate in a ritual scheme and 
belief structure that anonymous others also share’ (Whitehouse 2004, 69). In turn, the rituals 
that are shared can become a powerful indicator of identity. Whitehouse observes that 
although, ‘people who attend church regularly do not need to have quasi-theoretical 
knowledge of the links between standing and singing, kneeling and praying, and sitting and 
listening, such knowledge is bound to emerge over time’ (Clark 2004, 125-142). That 
knowledge can then articulate particular identities which are shaped more by the common 
performance of the ritual than by more abstract theoretical considerations. 
However, what is missing from this account are the practices which enable the rituals to take 
place in their particular form. These can be as basic as ensuring that the place where the ritual 
is performed is open and appropriately prepared. I call such practices ‘routines’.  I will 
illustrate the nature of such routines in the religious context shortly using the example of 
communion. However, thinking about what is needed to bring about the performance of 
rituals can lead us to a stream of work in organizational theory that seeks to characterize 
organizational routines. One aspect of this work has been the definition of routines as 
‘repetitive, recognizable patterns of interdependent actions, carried out by multiple actors’ 
(Feldman and Pentland 2003, 95). Developed from a somewhat uncomfortable (and 
implausible) melange of Giddens and Latour, this has led to a focus on the performance of 
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routines as a generative mechanism for organizational change.8 This tends to abstract routines 
from their wider organizational context, running the risk, as we have already noted, of 
obscuring the differential impact of those who set out the parameters for the exercise of 
routines. Far more helpful is the definition by Geoff Hodgson (2008, 21) in work influenced 
by dialogues with critical realism of organizational routines as ‘organizational dispositions to 
energize conditional patterns of behaviour within an organized group of individuals, 
involving sequential responses to cues’. Hodgson’s definition places the focus on 
organizational arrangements. The combination of a focus on organizational practices as 
rituals and routines has a number of implications for analysis. One is the need to place such 
practices in their structural and cultural context. From a structural perspective, we are 
interested in who has the power to specify the content of practices and who is licensed to 
participate in them. In what follows, differential rates of lay participation in certain religious 
practices are found to be of importance. From a cultural perspective, it is valuable to trace 
how pronouncements at an abstract conceptual level are translated into guidance for action. 
Here, absences, practices which are implied rather than being formally spelled out, are as 
important as what is formally promulgated. This combination of participation and guidance is 
revealed through an examination of situated action. Moreover, such action is best revealed by 
comparative analysis, comparisons which indicate what has been taken for granted. In turn, I 
will argue, such analysis points to the broader and enduring impact of the particular practices 
we have been examining. They form, that is, part of the structural and cultural conditioning of 
subsequent action, even when the beliefs that originally motivated them have, in relative 
terms, faded. 
The example used to illustrate these points is the Christian ritual of communion as practiced 
in eighteenth-century Scotland and England.9 The key point of contrast here is between open 
and closed communion. In the former, there is no qualification for the receipt of communion, 
which is often taken frequently. The church aspires to be a universal one, only excluding 
from the ritual those who have been found guilty of breaking core tenets of the faith. The 
consequence is that only minimal routines are necessary to prepare the conditions for exercise 
of the ritual, such as purchase of the necessary materials. Such was the system that obtained 
in the Church of England, a Protestant religious polity characterised as Episcopalianism – that 
is, a form of hierarchical organization marked by the formal authority of the bishop. Matters 
are very different in closed communion. Here, the sacrament is restricted to those who have 
met entry qualifications, whether these be membership or knowledge. In the Reformed 
Protestant tradition represented by the Presbyterian Church of Scotland access to communion 
was restricted to those who could demonstrate their awareness of the basics of the belief 
system. In turn, this related to the emphasis placed on the understanding of the Biblical 
foundations that were held to be fundamental to faith. Accordingly, the catechisms that we 
met earlier were used as the basis for education and examination. Ministers held special 
sessions in which they expounded the catechism and they conducted annual examinations of 
the faithful to test their knowledge and hence their suitability for communion. This 
challenging and time-consuming task necessarily meant that communion was a rare event; it 
was generally only celebrated once a year in most parishes in the eighteenth century. A desire 
to streamline the process meant the introduction of rolls of those deemed fit to participate. 
Detailed examination was then limited to those, generally the young, who sought admission 
to communion for the first time. This, however, did not mean that the routine of examination 
faded, rather that it shifted to the scrutiny of rolls to make sure that all on it were in good 
standing. Over time, this evolved into the production of printed templates on which to enter 
the information, templates which also evolved in order to record attendance. At this point it is 
important to note who was doing this examination. In Presbyterianism, local parishes were 
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administered by the minister together with a ‘session’ comprised of a number of ‘elders’. 
Selected by the existing session and ordained for life (and so strictly speaking not ‘lay’) these 
elders assisted the minister in maintaining discipline in the parish, acting, as it were, as his 
eyes and ears amongst the congregation. It was this collective body which ran the routines 
which made the ritual of closed communion possible. 
Once those who were fit to participate had been identified, some means of ensuring that they, 
and only they, had access to the communion venue was necessary. This was done by means 
of distributing metal tokens, generally of lead, bearing the year of communion and the parish 
name, to each communicant. Access to the communion venue was guarded by members of 
the session, who collected these tokens. They also served the tables, making sure that 
communion materials were present and order maintained. These duties could be onerous; as 
communion was only taken once a year it became a focus for mass participation, often 
involving significant numbers necessitating a series of consecutive sittings. After the event 
was over, sessions could count the communion tokens they had collected and so get a sense 
of how many had participated. Over time, the printed communion rolls became a means of 
recording this information, so that the participation of each individual in the congregation 
could be tracked. It should be clear that one concomitant of a belief in closed communion, 
which flowed from a particular interpretation of Biblical injunctions, was a range of routines 
which, in particular, demanded comprehensive record keeping. 
One feature which characterised this branch of Christianity was a focus on the creation and 
dissemination of guides to local practice. A somewhat legalistic focus on the translation of 
Biblical tenets into everyday practice meant the creation of printed books of guidance. 
Starting in 1696, the Church of Scotland attempted to specify, in a manner redolent of 
contemporary organizational handbooks, how units of the church were to behave (Mutch, 
2014). These efforts continued throughout the eighteenth century and established the standard 
for other important branches of the faith, notably in the United States of America. This 
translated a focus on order derived from Biblical injunctions into a more detailed set of 
prescriptions.10 However, this was never a complete guide to action, with many areas implicit 
rather than obvious. That is, examination of detailed practice reveals routines of 
accountability and record keeping that are clearly implied by injunctions about how rituals 
were to be conducted, but were nowhere spelled out. It is here that we need to bring in a 
further contrast with practice in England. Here, although a formally hierarchical system 
obtained, it was one which accorded considerable degrees of autonomy to local clerical 
incumbents. In turn, they were supported by limited lay participation. This was in the form of 
two churchwardens, who often served only annual terms of office. Thus, the whole system 
lacked the enduring, corporate form of Presbyterianism, meaning that consistent routines 
were difficult to establish. Guides for these officials appeared later than in Scotland and as 
the outcome of commercial calculation rather than official church policy. This meant that 
practice was a bewildering mixture of custom and tradition, often varying from area to area 
and bearing none of the appearance of a common system that characterised Scottish 
Presbyterianism. 
This combination of rituals and routines had consequences beyond the boundaries of the 
religious, especially as in both cases the respective churches were the national churches.11 
(The Church of England as the state church, established by law; the Church of Scotland as the 
de facto established church, even if this term is not strictly accurate). In order to see those 
consequences, we need to put the church systems in the context of supporting institutions, 
notably the law and education. The Scottish system rested on a degree of literate and 
numerate lay participation, capacities supplied by a basic education system which made 
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Scotland the most literate country in Europe at the end of the eighteenth century. This 
strength in basic education was fostered by the ambition of the church to have a school in 
every parish to teach basic literacy. This was not in order to foster secular development 
(although it did that) but in order that the faithful could read their Bibles (and to provide a 
recruitment route for some of the most able into the ministry). In turn, the focus on laying 
down books of order in writing which attempted to work from first principles to lay down 
guidance for the performance of routines dovetailed nicely with a legal system which drew on 
Roman law traditions to privilege rules derived from first principles. The outcome of this was 
a very early production of a detailed set of ‘Institutes of the Law of Scotland’ in the mid-
sixteenth century. This integrated set of institutions with shared or complementary practices 
which featured the specification of positions and practices with a focus on detailed record 
keeping and accountability contrasted sharply with the position in England. 
In England, there was no attempt until the nineteenth century to create a national system of 
elementary education. As a consequence, educational provision was patchy and dependent on 
local initiatives. Furthermore, the English educational system was dominated by Oxford and 
Cambridge universities, which privileged the formation of character for the landed elite. This 
focus on character was in turn mirrored in the local administrative systems, which emerged 
from the hotchpotch of tradition and custom at local level. An emphasis on custom in 
England, resulted in the development of a body of law using common-law, and this system 
was established considerably later than the Scottish system.12 It is only by relating practices 
to their wider context, informed by a morphogenetic approach, that we can trace these 
broader consequences of taken-for-granted practices. This is an approach which accepts that 
performance is creative in response to changing conditions and engaged in by actors capable 
of reflection on their conduct and adjusting it accordingly, but suggests that the practices they 
encounter provide shaping conditions for that action, something to be pursued further in the 
next section. 
Practices and Morphogenesis 
Historical examples have been used to illustrate the value of viewing practices as a central 
part of the social world that persons encounter. They provide the immediate context within 
which action takes place, but mediate and mobilize wider structural and cultural logics. 
Focusing on practices, rather than practice, raises questions about how practices get to be the 
way they are and how they are perceived by those who engage in them. Alex Callinicos 
(1987, cf. Joseph, 2004) mobilizes Heidegger’s notion of ‘throwness’ to explore how the 
most powerful practices are those which are taken-for-granted, which appear ‘natural’. 
Persons enter into contexts which are already shaped by previous rounds of morphogenesis 
and, especially when practices seem to ‘go with the grain’ or are perceived as legitimate, can 
find it either easier or more appropriate to accept them. For Heidegger, this is the default state 
of ‘being-in-the-world’ and the constructed nature of practices only comes visible in 
situations of breakdown. While much ‘routine’ action involves, as Porpora suggests, often 
small adjustments to performance, such that each is, at one scale, unique, this might not 
disrupt the overall routine. Indeed, the most successful routines might be ones that enable 
precisely such degrees of flexibility without disturbing the overall purpose of the routine. 
However, while some change might come from resistance to the routine, it might also be 
engendered by changing states of the world beyond the routine, which call its effectiveness 
into question. The extent to which change is endogenous or exogenous is an empirical one, 
but one source of change might be the increasing situational logic of opportunity pointed to 
by Donati and Archer (2015, 325). This is because an increasing range of structural and 
cultural alternatives are on offer to persons, and their mobility between contexts could make 
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them aware of these opportunities, causing them to question the routines they engage in. 
Thus, perhaps, in situations of morphogenesis, it is not only routine action that is called into 
question but routines themselves. 
In investigating the nature of routines, historical investigation of religious practices suggests 
two important considerations: technology and mechanisms of diffusion. Behind the practices 
examined above lay changes in technology. For example, seemingly mundane matters such as 
changes in papermaking which made paper both more available and less expensive had an 
impact on the format of accounts in the eighteenth-century Church of Scotland, with cramped 
formats which sought to make the most of available space giving way to more expansive 
formats which used white space to make the provision of information clearer (Mutch 2012b). 
In some cases, however, these opportunities were not taken up, suggesting the ways in which 
taken-for-granted practices might endure long after new conditions of possibility would 
seemingly render them obsolete. In his study of the Reformation, Robert Wuthnow (1989, 
149) has pointed to the way in which the new technology of printing was seized upon by 
Protestant reformers to distribute their ideas through the creation of new genre, the printed 
sermon. In this fashion, theological debates once reserved only for the religious elite became 
accessible to new social groups.  
The historical examination of religious practices shows both the value of a morphogenetic 
approach, in that it helps us to connect practices to their wider cultural and structural context, 
and the value of incorporating practices into the morphogenetic framework.  This does not 
challenge the overall framework for morphogenetic analysis, but supplies a nudge in the 
direction of examining the nature and formation of practices, as well as how they are 
performed. Whilst more might be said beyond my distinction between rituals and routines, 
nevertheless the distinction itself has proved extremely valuable in historical examinations of 
the conduct of religion, bringing to the fore aspects of social life that have been obscured by 
analyses that focus on institutions or beliefs. These remain vitally important in conditioning 
the practices with which actors must engage, but these practices cannot be simply ‘read off’ 
from formal statements of belief. The same approach might be valuable for examining other 
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